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Sanctions are much easier to use against your 
allies than against your enemies. A friend will 
want to stay in your good books, and is much 
more likely to modify his behaviour than an 
adversary, who will probably just harden his 
resolve to outdo you. The Trump administration 
liberally used sanctions against allies in Europe 
and Asia, who did not exactly cave in but did 
not want things to escalate either.1  The US 
trade war with China, on the other hand, cost 
both sides dearly, without resolving anything.  
In a coordinated move with the US, the UK, 
and Canada, the EU has adopted sanctions 
against four Chinese officials and one entity for 
violating the human rights of the Uighur 
people in Xinjiang province.2 That is fully 
legitimate: as a union of democracies, the EU 
has a moral duty to speak up for human rights 
everywhere. But are sanctions the most 
effective way of doing so? 
 
That depends, of course, on the effect sought: 
what is the EU objective? If the end is to change 
China’s policy, the sanctions are far too moderate 
to score any effect, for policy is set in Beijing, not 
by provincial-level officials. But even if the EU 
were to adopt much further-reaching sanctions, 
targeting the Chinese leadership or its economy, 
China would still not budge. For the Chinese 
regime, this is about vital interests: the power of 
the CCP, domestic stability, and the security of 
the Belt and Road Initiative, for which Xinjiang 
is crucial. And no state, and certainly no great 
power, compromises on vital interests unless 
forced to. But the EU will not go to extremes 
because its own vital interests, in contrast, are not 
directly at stake – and China understands that very 
well. The EU has grave humanitarian concerns, but 
the human rights situation in Xinjiang in no way 
affects the security of Europe. The same applies to 
the situation in Hongkong.  
Thus, even far-reaching sanctions cannot easily 
affect change on the ground when they concern 
an issue that the targeted party deems vital, 
especially if the issue is not vital to the party 
taking the sanctions. This is even more so when 
targeting a great power. That was the case in the 
past: four decades of pressure during the Cold 
War produced little or no improvement in the 
human rights situation in the Soviet Union. And 
it remains the case today: the EU and China both 
are great powers that are in many ways mutually 
 
 





dependent; neither has much leverage to force 
the other to change its domestic policies.3   
SIGNALLING HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS 
The EU’s current sanctions against China can only 
serve a signalling purpose, therefore, without any hope 
of effecting short-term change. Yet, quoting William 
the Silent: one need not hope to undertake, nor 
succeed to persevere. In other words, the EU can and 
must continue to speak up for human rights, in order 
to maintain the norm and underscore that violating 
human rights is abnormal. But the question still 
remains: are sanctions the best of way of signalling 
this?  
 
Sanctions do amplify the signal that the EU finds a 
particular human rights situation, such as in Xinjiang, 
unacceptable. But as China is an authoritarian state (as 
is Russia), there obviously are endless grounds to 
legitimately adopt human rights sanctions. As stated 
above, against a great power, human rights sanctions 
are mostly symbolic. Symbols often trigger strong 
emotions, however; and when emotions sway reason, 
sound strategy-making becomes difficult. Sanctions 
usually provoke countersanctions, setting in motion a 
negative spiral that will cost both parties – yet without 
in any way improving the lives of those whose human 
rights are being violated.  
 
Actually, the EU’s signal can also be loud and clear 
without sanctions, if the Union and each Member 
State consistently and publicly repeat it in every 
interaction with China. While sanctions are always 
legitimate, in view of the universality of human rights, 
they are not necessarily opportune, therefore. 
 
CHINA’S OVERREACTION  
As expected, China has taken countermeasures, 
which are evidently disproportionate. Targeting 
individual members of parliament and academics, but 
also the entire Subcommittee on Human Rights of the 
European Parliament and the EU’s Political and 
Security Committee, plus a think-tank and a 
foundation, is so much of an overreaction, in fact, that 
it goes against China’s interests. For one, those same 
members of parliament will have to ratify the 
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) that the EU 
and China announced in December 2020. And it is 
precisely the academics who help create a nuanced 
understanding of China.  
 
The temptation in many corners is, of course, for the 
EU to react forcefully, perhaps even with another 
round of sanctions. China’s overreaction thus risks 
triggering the negative spiral and undoing one of the 
main features of the EU’s China strategy: its 
willingness to compartmentalise relations – to treat 
China as a partner, a competitor or a rival depending 
on China’s position on the issue at hand. In that logic, 
it ought to be quite possible to announce the CAI in 
December and adopt human rights sanctions in 
March, counterintuitive though it may appear to 
Beijing.  
 
Compartmentalisation, which can be paraphrased as 
“cooperate when you can, push back when you 
must”, is actually very much in China’s interest. For 
the alternative is that the EU shifts to the opposite 
stance: “push back when you can, cooperate when 
you must”. That was the attitude of the Trump 
administration, and might become Biden’s as well. If 
that happens, more and more potential areas for 
cooperation will be blocked out, and China will 
increasingly be facing a firm US-EU bloc, instead of a 
more flexible three-way great power game (or four-
way, counting Russia) – exactly what Beijing has been 
seeking to avoid.  
 
China would be well advised, therefore, to make some 
conciliatory gestures now, and demonstrate that 
compartmentalisation is still possible. Not only to 
maintain cooperative relations with the EU in areas of 
common interest, but to convince the US of engaging 
in selected areas of cooperation as well. Rather than 
emphasise, as Chinese diplomats now do, that in 
China appetite for the CAI is not as strong as the EU 
 
 





might think, proof of sincerity is required, if China 
does not want to see its future access to the European 
market tighten. 
 
THE EU’S RED LINES  
The EU, for its part, ought to resist the temptation of 
further sanctions at this stage. Sanctions must be a policy, 
not an urge. Furthermore, the current low in relations 
cannot logically be a ground for rejecting the CAI, for the 
human rights situation in Xinjiang was not different when 
the EU agreed to it. If human rights violations are a reason 
to refuse any cooperation, then the EU should never have 
embarked on negotiations for the CAI in the first place. 
That would run counter to its strategy of 
compartmentalisation, however, which seeks to 
cooperate when possible precisely in order to involve all 
powers in the running of the current world order.  
 
Brussels must draw its red lines in the right place, 
therefore. The European interest demands that the EU 
cooperate with authoritarian states. The red line is that by 
cooperating, the EU itself cannot become party to the 
human rights violations that its authoritarian partners 
commit. The CAI with China is possible therefore, on the 
condition that no product that is the result of human 
rights violations, such as forced labour in Xinjiang, enters 
the European market, for that would make the EU 
complicit.  
 
That must be ensured by building in strong and verifiable 
mechanisms into the CAI itself, but also by adopting 
general legislation, for China is not the only culprit.4  
Towards China, such legislation, which is in the making, 
will be a much stronger signal than sanctions. It also has a 
lot more potential to affect the situation on the ground. 
China will not change its overall policy towards the 
Uighurs, but it will have to adapt production processes 
and labour conditions if it does not want to lose market 
share. At the same time, binding EU rules reduce the 
exposure of European companies, who are now caught 
between European consumers’ concerns over complicity 
in human rights violations and a boycott by Chinese 
consumers. 
SANCTIONS AND VITAL INTERESTS  
If human rights sanctions have but limited 
effectiveness, sanctions may be required in other 
policy areas. China has also crossed the EU’s red lines 
in its foreign policy, which does affect European 
security. The fait accompli created by the military 
annexation of the South China Sea is the most 
obvious example. Others are subversive activities on 
the territory of EU Member States, attempts at 
coercing EU governments to adopt certain policies, or 
intimidation of Uighur people residing in the EU. In 
these areas, the EU’s own interests are much more 
directly at stake, and more than symbolic sanctions 
may be called for.  
 
The EU ought to show more resolve when reacting to 
illegitimate, and certainly against illegal, activities on its 
territory, by China, Russia, and others. The Treaty on 
European Union includes, in Article 42.7, a collective 
defence guarantee, but the EU does not implement it – 
collective territorial defence against military threats is 
organised through NATO. In the spirit of 42.7, the EU 
could, however, organise solidarity against all non-
military challenges posed by foreign powers. A cyber 
action against one Member State must be seen as an 
action against all, just like economically coercing one 
means coercing all, and should automatically produce a 
joint response. Under the heading of resilience, the EU 
could thus not only take defensive measures to safeguard 
its sovereignty (for example, by leveraging access to the 
single market through investment screening). It could, in 
addition, elaborate a doctrine of deterrence against all forms 
of subversion and coercion, based on a demonstrated 
willingness to retaliate by way of sanctions.  
 
If the red lines when it comes to subversion or coercion 
of the EU itself are relatively clear, more strategic debate 
is required to forge an EU consensus on where the red 
lines are in China’s foreign policy towards third states. 
Certainly, military aggression (for example, to change the 
status quo on Taiwan) should lead to sanctions, as was 
the case after Russia invaded Ukraine. Were China to 
force a country to sever relations with the EU against its 
 
 





will (in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative, for 
example), that too would call for sanctions. At the same 
time, no country is aspiring to become a Chinese vassal, 
but if only China puts a serious offer on the table, the 
EU (and the US) can hardly condemn others for taking 
it up. What the EU is willing to offer to third countries is 
at least as important as what it is willing to do against 
China, therefore. That calls for a strengthening of, and 
more budget for, the EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
To put it bluntly: the EU’s vital interest is not how China 
treats the Chinese, but how China treats the EU. Yet 
somehow Brussels always gets a lot more excited over 
human rights violations in China than over Chinese 
transgressions against the EU itself. The EU must care 
for human rights – that goes without saying. But it must 
also be aware of what is vital and what is not, of where it 
has leverage and where it has not, and use its instruments 
accordingly.  
 
The EU and the Member States can in effect signal their 
human rights concerns to China (and Russia) loudly and 
clearly without all the time resorting to symbolic 
sanctions, by consistently and publicly condemning 
violations. Effective sanctions, i.e. further-reaching and 
aimed at actually inducing a change in policy, ought to be 
mostly reserved to deter, or to retaliate against, actions 
that directly affect the vital interests of the EU itself or 
that threaten international peace and security.  
China too must reflect on where its interests lie, 
however. Perhaps Beijing feels that the EU will in the 
end always prioritise its economic interests anyway, and 
no longer cares too much about its image. That would 
be a serious underestimation, however, of the 
resentment that its often overbearing behaviour has 
provoked in the EU. Overall, through its strategy of 
“cooperate when you can, push back when you must”, 
the EU has consistently shown that it considers the rise 
of China to great power status a normal evolution, and 
that it is quite willing to work with China within the core 
rules of the existing world order. China had better not let 
that goodwill go to waste. 
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1 Each Even the Biden administration may introduce additional sanctions against European companies involved in the 
Nordstream 2 gas pipeline between Germany and Russia.  
2 In its first application of the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, the Council on 22 March 2021 also adopted 
sanctions against individuals and entities in Eritrea, Libya, North Korea, South Sudan, and Russia.  
3 This interdependence is only symmetric in the aggregate, however: in several specific sectors, the dependence is rather 
more one-way.  
4 There is a qualitative difference, because China persecutes the Uighurs politically, but in many sectors, in many countries, 
labour conditions are as horrible. Where indentured labour survives, for example, people’s living conditions may in practice 
not differ much. If the EU is serious about human rights and labour conditions, the new legislation ought to target this too 
– we cannot simply accept the situation that the market has created.  
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